1. Standard boilerplate; any misdeeds should be punished by the military. The flipside to the emphasis on military justice is that, of course, it doesn't really concern us here at home.
2. This is war, and we don't know what those prisoners were doing or why they were tortured.
2b. Cal tells that (admittedly) horrifying story of a young buy who shot at a soldier after he figured the soldier had him pegged as a non-combatant. Apparently nothing will happen to this kid (according to Thomas).
3. You get upset about a few tortures and deaths in Abu Ghraib prison, but you didn't care when Saddam had a much more extensive terror and rape campaign. One assumes this part of the argument is directed at European and Middle Eastern Critics of the occupation.
4. Repeating Rush's line from yesterday, we don't have to worry about how this will look in the Middle East.
"There's much talk about how the pictures of prisoner abuse will look in the Arab world and how they might set back American efforts to pacify Iraq and advance U.S. policies throughout the region. The Arab world does not need excuses to excoriate the United States. Even so-called "allies" such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt regularly vilify America in sermons from their mosques, on state-controlled television and in government newspaper editorials, columns and political cartoons.
This is one of the great fallacies in dealing with such people: that what the West does influences how they think and their course of action."
And some responses.
1. I'd also like to see the system examined to find out where exactly it broke down. You have a chain of command; knowledge about what was going on in Abu Ghraib prison was probably not limited to those at the bottom rungs of the ladder (maybe it was, but we don't know without an investigation).
2. We don't know why those prisoners were being tortured, fair enough. But if that's so let's again have an investigation to figure out why they were doing such things. There may well be mitigating circumstances.
2b. Well it is a chilling story, it's largely irrevelant.
3. The United States and Britain are being held to a higher standard than Saddam Hussein. What a surprise! I have to say I want the United States to be held to a higher standard than Saddam Hussein.
4. Let's draw another Venn Diagram. An extra complicated one.
I guess that's not as complicated as I thought it would be. At any rate there are three groups of people in Iraq (based on very specific criteria). There are Iraqis who, for one reason or another, are unlikely to take up arms against the United States. There are Iraqis who could, under the right circumstances decide to take up arms against the United States. And there is a third group who already have taken up arms against the United States.
Now here's where the argument starts; we don't know the relative size of these circles. How many Iraqis who aren't fighting the United States right now, might choose to do so down the road? No way to answer that question as far as I can tell. Cal Thomas (and Rush) apparently believe that that population is very small; most people have already decided. I believe that it could be a sizable population, and something to worry about.
I will tell what part of this argument drives me nuts. It's contained in this line. "This is one of the great fallacies in dealing with such people: . . . " The basic argument hinges on the very unscientific and boneheaded theory that Iraqis are different from regular people. All one has to do is ask himself (assuming one is from the US) how would you react if you saw those things, done in Abu Ghraib prison, inflicted on American Citizens? Why do you assume Iraqis would react any differently?
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